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Abstract
We study the allocation of cadaveric donor kidneys for transplantation based merely
on waiting time. Despite the first impression, this simple allocation rule turns out to
possess very attractive ethical and medical properties. Current allocation rules do not
consider criteria such as sex, age and race perhaps for fear of morally unacceptable
allocations, although certain combinations of these criteria are known to affect graft
survival rates. We demonstrate that allocation by waiting time automatically protects
disadvantaged patient types and puts them in a near to optimal position. The inclusion
of sex, age and race will therefore not lead to morally unacceptable allocations. This
allows individual patients to improve the expected survival time of their graft relative
to the status quo without being penalized by the allocation rule. Moreover, decisions
about when to start compromising on expected graft survival rates in favour of shorter
waiting times are made locally by patients and their medical advisers rather than by a
centralized protocol.
JEL classification numbers: D61, D63, I18.
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1 Introduction
We propose to allocate cadaveric donor kidneys primarily on the basis of recipients’
waiting time. When a new donor organ becomes available, the patient with the longest
waiting time is first offered this organ for transplantation. If the patient and her medical
advisers reject the organ, it is offered to the next patient on the waiting list who can
again accept the organ or pass it on to the next patient etc. Refusal to accept an organ
does not alter patients’ position on the waiting list. We provide an explicit protocol
for this process. We retain some control over the patients’ range of choices to exclude
medically impossible allocations (e.g., incompatible blood types) and to guarantee that
the patient is in a fit state to undergo transplantation. Waiting time is measured from
the start of dialysis and ties in waiting time are broken randomly. Some modifications
will be made to accommodate the special needs of children or patients with high medical
urgency. Criteria that equalize regional or international export/import balances can also
be added if we wish.
Allocation by waiting time (AWT) is a simple, decentralized and transparent mecha-
nism that is responsive to the patients’ and their medical advisers’ judgement about how
to balance waiting time against other (medical) criteria. We show that AWT removes
the tension that is present in current allocation rules between optimal medical predictors
of graft survival and concerns of distributive justice. We shall show that AWT auto-
matically protects disadvantaged patient types. For example, it leads to an automatic
protection of patients with blood type O. Moreover, it allows patients to improve the
expected survival time of their graft relative to the status quo without being penalized
by the allocation system. These optimality properties are established by a simple sta-
tistical argument: Patients of a rare medical type, for example, wait on average longer
before an organ of their rare type becomes available. This increased waiting time gives
rare patients automatically a higher priority under AWT. Hence, the probability is very
small that an organ of a rare type will be allocated to a patient of a more common type.
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The allocation methods currently used in Europe and North America already give a
significant weight to a patient’s waiting time. Wujciak/Opelz (1993) made an impressive
argument for using waiting time as a criterion in addition to HLA matches and PRA
sensitization (measures of antigen and antibody compatibility). In the current allocation
rules of Eurotransplant and the American United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS),
HLA matching is traded off against long waiting times so that patients of rare medical
types can become eligible for an organ with a compromised HLA match. For short waiting
times, patients of rare medical types are at a clear disadvantage because they are unlikely
to find an organ with a good HLA match. This disadvantage is only partly offset by the
inclusion of ‘matchbility’ (the probability of finding a better match in the future) as a
criterion. Rare patient types are forced to compete for organs mainly through prolonged
waiting times. They are not given the opportunity to determine their own trade–off
between additional waiting time and a compromised HLA match. In North America,
this leads to imbalances in the racial composition of the recipients. Moreover, morally
sensitive patient attributes such as sex, age and race are not systematically taken into
account by the current allocation practice although some of their combinations appear to
be correlated with graft survival rates (Persijn/Smits/De Meester, 1999). If these criteria
were taken into account, additional imbalances would arise. In Europe, for instance,
the ‘old–for–old’ programme in which kidneys from older donors are allocated to older
recipients meets with some resistance on the part of older patients. Such ethical problems
can only be expected to intensify as non–immunological factors continue to emerge as
predictors of graft survival rates.
It is clear that any allocation method must make certain trade–offs between medical
criteria, waiting time and other special attributes of the patients. AWT determines these
trade–offs locally through the decisions of patients and their medical advisers. Currently
used allocation methods specify such trade–offs in a quantitative manner through a cen-
tralized allocation protocol. Patients collect a certain number of points, for instance, for
medical criteria (HLA matching, PRA sensitization, matchability) and for waiting time.
The relative number of points awarded reflects the trade–offs that are implicit in the
allocation method. This point system has to be adjusted frequently to respond to med-
ical innovation and unfulfilled concerns for distributive justice. In economic theory it is
well–known that such trade–offs are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to make for a
central decision maker like Eurotransplant or UNOS. More importantly, there is no sound
medical or moral basis for making these trade–offs on behalf of the patients. Patients dif-
fer strongly in their psychological, social and emotional condition. They may even differ
in their rational evaluation of the risks and the benefits of dialysis and transplantation.
Under the current system, patients are in a very poor position to choose their own
trade–offs. Firstly, the system structurally penalizes selective patients who want to
achieve better medical matches than chosen by the central allocation protocol. For in-
stance, patients who bypass an offer because they want to match the donor organ for sex
or age are not guaranteed to be offered the next available organ. Instead, they will have
to compete for the next organ with patients who will have newly joined the waiting list
and who may have a better medical compatibility with the next organ. In other words, if
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a selective patient turns down an organ, then a weaker competitor receives the organ and
is removed from the waiting list while new and stronger competitors may still join the
waiting list. A selective patient’s ability to choose is therefore not preserved from round
to round. Secondly, patients cannot achieve shorter waiting times than chosen by the
central allocation protocol even if they are prepared to accept marginal organs. To use a
technical term from welfare theory, the current allocation system is not Pareto optimal
or efficient (cf. below) because it does not take account of patients’ preferences. Thirdly,
there is no explicit protocol to accommodate the patients’ choices in the allocation pro-
cess. Fourthly, patients lack relevant medical information. A project is currently under
way to design a decision support system that conveys medically relevant information to
the patient and their medical advisers in a cognitively and psychologically tractable for-
mat. When joining the waiting list, we envisage the patients and their medical advisers
to draw up a plan that specifies at what time they wish to accept organ with specific char-
acteristics. For instance, a patient may decide to accept a ‘marginal’ organ (an organ of
poor quality) in return for a short waiting time but not after a long waiting time. Patients
have the opportunity to revise this plan on a regular basis. Patients can also choose from
a set of default plans or recommendations by the central allocation authority. Patients
may prefer to delegate the choice of such a plan to their medical advisers. Transplant
surgeons will always play an important role in this process because of unquantifiable
characteristics of donor organs that require a surgeon’s medical judgement.
Although high graft survival rates are not the only relevant criterion by which to
judge an allocation mechanism, they are certainly one very important criterion. The
average medical optimality of AWT depends on local decisions and local evaluations of
acceptable trade–offs. Patients have a definite incentive to maximize their graft survival
rates, especially in view of medical side effects and complications arising from poor com-
patibility. Moreover, AWT allows the systematic inclusion of medical criteria such as
age, sex and race that provide improved predictors of a graft’s expected survival time.
This may suggest that the medical performance of AWT will compare favourably with
that of the current allocation rules because it taps into a potential for improvement. The
exact performance of AWT can only be gauged once we have collected data on patients’
trade–offs.
2 Evaluation
2.1 Optimal compensation of disadvantage
AWT promotes equality of opportunity among patients. Equality of opportunity does not
imply that all patients receive an organ with the same expected survival time after the
same waiting period. The persistent shortage of suitable donor organs and the medical
differences among patients make it impossible to achieve such equality of outcomes.
Equality of opportunity implies, however, that the effect of any natural disadvantage
is kept as small as possible. AWT does indeed possess this optimality property. It
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ensures that patients of a disadvantaged medical type wait for a time that is close to
the minimum possible waiting time. Any remaining imbalances are either the result
of a natural disadvantage that our current medical technology is unable to compensate
or the result of the disadvantaged patient’s personal choice. Since AWT automatically
protects disadvantaged patients, special precautions taken on behalf of these patients are
superfluous. We will examine these optimality properties from a statistical viewpoint.
Any allocation rule has to operate in a stochastic environment in which donor organs and
new patients appear in a random order and at random times and in which the survival
time of a graft can only be predicted with a certain probability. No algorithm can avoid
inequalities that are caused by such random variations in the supply and demand for
organs and in the actual survival time of a graft. The best we can do is to compare
alternative allocation rules on a statistical basis.1
Over and above providing equality of opportunity, AWT has additional, morally de-
sirable properties that concern the manner in which it allocates scarce resources among
patients that are not distinguished by natural advantages or disadvantages. Firstly, AWT
results in allocations in which we cannot make any individual better off without making
some individual worse off.2 For obvious reasons, such allocations are also called ‘effi-
cient’ or Pareto optimal (named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, 1848–1923).
Since both the Eurotransplant and the UNOS rule do not reflect patients’ preferences,
they threaten to produce allocations that could be improved without making any patient
worse off. Secondly, AWT results in ‘envy–free’ allocations in which no patient would
want to switch places with anybody else who joined the waiting list at roughly the same
time (Tinbergen, 1953, Foley, 1967, Thomson/Varian, 1985). In other words, no patient
i would prefer to receive an organ allocated to another patient j if i also had to accept
the same expected waiting time for this organ as patient j did (assuming that ceteris
paribus patients prefer shorter waiting times). In this sense, envy–free allocations pro-
vide a conflict–free and harmonious state of affairs. As a sorry implication of the current
donation rates, this condition is only satisfied for patients who join the waiting list at
roughly the same time. Since donor organs currently arrive at a slower rate than pa-
tients, the waiting list must be increasing in size and future patients will on average have
to wait longer than current patients. If donation rates were one day to exceed kidney
failure rates, the situation would conversely favour patients who are born later and join
the waiting list at a later time. In the Eurotransplant and UNOS algorithms, waiting
time gathers an increasing weight and will require repeated adjustments. We will later
consider a formula for compensating this temporal effect.
1Hild (2001a, 2001d) provides theoretical reasons why such an ex ante evaluation is preferable to an
ex post analysis in terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years.
2We resolve a patient’s indifference between accepting and rejecting an organ by passing the organ
on to the next patient. We assume that if some patient is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
an organ, there is some other patient with a shorter waiting time who prefers to accept the organ. This
guarantees a Pareto optimal allocation of the chance to receive an organ depending on waiting time.
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Rare medical types
It is intuitively easy to see why AWT puts disadvantaged patients in a near optimal
position. As a first example, we focus on disadvantages that are linked to rare medical
types. Without any loss of generality, we may suppose that we have patients and organs
of two types, the first representing a common combination of medical characteristics and
the second representing a rare combination. AWT guarantees that with high probability
an organ of a rare medical type is not misallocated to a patient of a common medical
type. The reason is simply that patients of a rare medical type have to wait longer until
the next organ of their type becomes available. This increases their waiting time and
moves them closer to the front of the waiting list. The rare patient type is therefore
automatically eligible for the next organ of the rare organ type.
This intuitive analysis is borne out by a precise statistical treatment (cf. Appendix
A). The probability of misallocating an organ of a rare type to a patient of a common
type quickly falls to zero as the number of allocated organs increases. If a rare type
occurs with a frequency of 5% in the population of donors and recipients, the probability
of a misallocation falls to 1% as we go less than 200 allocations. Even in the smaller
European allocation system, 200 organs become available in less than 4 weeks. Figure 1
charts this probability for different frequencies of the ‘rare’ type. The lower part of this
figure show a contour chart of this probability surface. For any frequency, the fallibility of
AWT is reduced to below 1% after as few as 800 allocations. It is by no means necessary
to assume that the frequency of the rare type be the same in the population of donors and
in the population of recipients. Our precise calculations let us make predictions about
situations where these frequencies differ. The probability of a misallocation is, of course,
not the only relevant measure of optimality. Another measure of allocative efficiency
is the average proportion of misallocated organs of the rare type. This measure is not
plotted here but, displaying the same behaviour that we saw before, it quickly falls to
zero as we go through a year’s supply of donor organs.3
In the USA, the focus on medical criteria (HLA matching, PRA sensitization) disad-
vantages less frequent population groups, particularly African–Americans who wait signif-
icantly longer for kidney transplants than do Caucasian patients. Leffell/Zachary (1999)
conclude that the 1995 policy change in the UNOS allocation rule did not remedy this
problem. Although Caucasian patients constitute only 51.2% of the total US patient
pool, they receive 78.5% of all organs that are allocated with 0 HLA mismatches and
54.4% of all other organs even after the 1995 revisions of the allocation rule. While
African–Americans constitute 30.6% of the total patient pool, they receive only 10.5%
0 of all organs that are allocated with 0 HLA mismatches. This is a troublesome de-
velopment of a well–intentioned allocation rule and clearly shows that the authority to
determine trade–offs and to compromise on HLA matching must be put back in the hands
of the medically disadvantaged patients themselves. For a rare type with a frequency of
3We note that a rare patient type will for statistical reasons suffer from a greater variation in the
duration of waiting times. It is outside of our power to compensate the rare patient type for this
statistical disadvantage.
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Figure 1: Probability of misallocation.
(α = 1)
30% in the overall population, the probability of a misallocation falls to 1.5% after less
than 300 allocations.
Our calculations are strictly based on a worst–case scenario. We assume that pa-
tients of a rare type can only accept organs of the same type and that all patients of
the common type accept any organ that is offered to them. This extreme assumption
simulates a situation of extreme competition and of an extreme disadvantage of the rare
type. Remarkably, AWT yields close to optimal results even in this extreme environment.
Our second conservative assumption concerns the initial composition of the waiting list.
Our calculations assume that the waiting list has no history and is randomly composed
of rare and common types. In reality, we inherit a waiting list that already contains
patients of the rare type at the front of the waiting list. This decreases the probability of
a misallocation even further. Our calculations also allow us to study an optimal initial
configuration of the waiting list before we implement AWT. In other words, a fine–tuned
implementation of AWT can decrease the probability of a misallocation even further. As
a singular measure, fine–tuning involve moving some disadvantage patients further to the
front of the waiting list and then letting AWT work on its own. A third conservative as-
sumption concerns the proportion α of those rare patients who choose to maximize their
medical outcome regardless of other factors such as waiting time. Suppose, for example,
rare patients occur with a frequency of 30% in the population. Suppose, furthermore,
the 50% of these rare patients are selective and accept only an organ of the rare type.
In this case, the selective rare patients can fairly demands 15% of all organs of the rare
type. Figure 2 shows that the selective group of rare patients does indeed receive almost
exactly this amount of rare organs. This figure plots the difference between the actual
and the minimal rate of allocation of rare organs to common patients. This difference
falls quickly to zero. Hence, patients of the rare type will not accumulate on the waiting
list since they receive in the long run exactly their share of rare organs. Figure 3 plots
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Frequency of disadvantaged patient type = .3.
the same distance for a disadvantage patient type that occurs with a frequency of 50% in
the population. Finally, we note that our calculations indulge in one simplifying assump-
tion. They assume that patients do not rejoin the waiting list for a second transplant.
In reality, Eurotransplant reported 18% of second time transplantations among cadav-
eric transplants for 1999. This simplifying assumption allows us to derive an analytic
description of our problem while we would otherwise have to resort to simulations.
Asymmetric medical types
Disadvantages can also arise from asymmetries in the capability of a medical type to
donate and to receive organs. Some medical types can donate organs to patients of
other types without affecting graft survival rates, while recipients of this type maximize
their graft survival rates only when they receive an organ from a donor of same type.
Organs of blood type O can be allocated patients of any blood type but patients of
type O can only receive organs of type O. Both the Eurotransplant and the UNOS rule
make special provisions for patients of blood type O. The same statistical argument as
above establishes that AWT automatically protects patients of blood type O and that no
additional protection mechanisms are required. In 1999, Eurotransplant reported that
the proportion of patients of blood type O was 39% among patients newly added to the
waiting list and 48% among all patients on the waiting list while 44% of all donors were
of this type. In the same year, UNOS reports for the USA that 53% of all patients on the
waiting list were of blood type O while 40% of all donors had this blood type. Using a
frequency of 50% for organs and patients of blood type O, the uppermost curve labelled
‘alpha = 1’ in Figure 3 shows the probability of misallocating an organ of blood type O
to a patient of a different blood type. After only a comparatively small number of 800
allocations, the probability of misallocating drops below 1%.
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number of transplants 3 year survival rate
male to female 1771 74%
male to male 3109 76%
female to female 765 74%
female to male 1244 70%
Table 1: The effect of sex on graft survival (Busson/Benoit, 1997).
It has been argued that additional non–immunological factors influence graft survival
rates. The conclusions of Busson/Benoit (1997) would imply that the current allocation
process disadvantages men. According to this study, men maximize their graft survival
rates when they receive an organ from a male donor, while the influence of the donor’s
sex is much less pronounced for female recipients (cf. Table 1). The authors find that
a sex mismatch erodes graft survival rates at 3 years for male recipients by about 6%.
Persijn/Smits/De Meester (1999) also report an effect in this direction but their finding
is less pronounced. Meier–Kriesche et al. (2001) find no such effect but they seem not to
differentiate between patients receiving an organ of a different sex. Doubtlessly, more
studies are needed to resolve these questions. We can nonetheless note that matching for
these non–immunological criteria opens a Pandora’s box of moral dilemmas under the
current allocation methods. We study the example of men matching for sex. AWT again
offers a clear improvement over the status quo for the disadvantaged sex and reduces
any imbalances that could have been avoided. In 1999, women occurred in the European
cadaveric kidney donor population roughly with a frequency of 43%. For the sake of
brevity, we approximate this situation by consulting Figure 3 for a frequency of 50%. A
misallocation would occur if we allocated a male organ to a female patient while there
was a shortage of male organs among male patients with the same waiting time as the
female patient. The figure shows that the probability of such a misallocation quickly falls
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to zero. This is true even if only some proportion α of all men decide to be selective and
match the donor organ for sex.
2.2 Medical optimality
AWT resolves the moral dilemma of reconciling the maximization of an individual’s
well–being with a societal notion of distributive justice. As more non–immunological and
morally sensitive factors emerge as predictors of graft survival rates, this has implications
for the medical optimality of our proposal. AWT allows criteria like sex, age and race to
be taken into account without violating moral fairness norms. This procedure therefore
produces outcomes that are as close to the medical optimum as current medical knowledge
allows and as close as the patients desire. If AWT falls short of the medical optimum,
it does so in response to how the patients value the importance of graft survival rates
vis–a–vis waiting time. There are no objective grounds for criticizing the patients’ choice.
Patients have a definite incentive to maximize their graft survival rates, especially in
view of medical side–effects and complications arising from poor medical compatibility.
Moreover, their choice will be guided by medical experts and we will retain some con-
trol over the range of the choice that can be offered to the patients on medical grounds.
Patients in poor medical condition may, for instance, be suspended from the waiting list
until their condition improves. This suggests that the medical performance of AWT may
not be far from the medical optimum. It may in principle even perform better than the
current allocation mechanisms that do not take non–immunological criteria into account.
If the current allocation rules were in the future to include non–immunological criteria,
they would become entangled in moral dilemmas concerning the maximization of individ-
uals’ expected medical outcome and norms of distributive justice. Wujciak/Opelz (1993)
reach a different conclusion in their discussion of a similar ‘first in, first out’ allocation
method. The poor performance of this method in Wujciak and Opelz’s simulation de-
pends on the fact that an organ is allocated to first patient on the waiting list without
considering the patient’s own choice. In particular, the patient is not given a choice
between accepting or declining the allocated kidney on the basis of her preferences for
waiting time, HLA matching, PRA sensitization etc. This is an unrealistic assumption
since patients have a very clear incentive to choose organs promising a high survival rate.
AWT could widen the acceptability of age–specific matching that is, for example,
intended by Eurotransplant’s ‘old–for–old’ programme. Such programmes become super-
fluous because waiting time creates an incentive for older people to consider accepting
an organ from an older patient without a great loss in their graft survival rate. AWT
also allows an increased use of marginal organs based on circumspect local decision. The
patients’ informed consent avoids severe legal problems of adequate disclosure of medical
risks (for the USA, cf. Canterbury v Spence, Ref. 464F dd 772, 1972, USCA District of
Columbia; for Great Britain, cf. Bolam, 2 All ER118, 1957).
9
2.3 Interpersonal comparisons
The properties of allocation methods have been studied extensively by a large body of
literature in social choice theory (Mongin/d’Aspremont, 1998). We here present a positive
conclusion from this literature supporting our proposal. The current Eurotransplant and
UNOS allocation rules are special cases of a general class of rules whose properties are
very well understood.4 The most crucial insight of the last 30 years of theoretical research
on allocation rules concerns the critical importance of trade–offs between the well–being
of different individuals. Such trade–offs require not only intra-personal comparisons
of a single individual’s well–being under different allocations, but also inter-personal
comparisons of different individuals’ well–being under different allocations.
Intra-personal comparison: Patient 1 is better off with 1 HLA–mismatch and 6 years of
waiting than with 3 HLA–mismatches and 3 years of waiting.
Inter-personal comparison: 1 HLA–mismatch and 6 years of waiting for patient 1 is bet-
ter than 3 HLA–mismatches and 3 years of waiting for patient 2.
The allocation rules used by Eurotransplant and UNOS make both intra- and inter-
personal comparisons that are implicit in the schema through which patients are awarded
points. The point schema implicitly determines by how much patient 1’s well–being
with 1 HLA–mismatch and 6 years of waiting outweighs patient 2’s well–being with 3
HLA–mismatches and 3 years of waiting. These interpersonal comparisons may not be
intentional. At least in the published literature, these point schemas are judged by equity
criteria pertaining to the overall allocation of organs and not to trade–offs among indi-
viduals. Wujciak/Opelz (1993), for example, point out that their XCOMB point schema
yields overall survival rates that are close to the optimum (using only HLA matching
as a predictor of medical outcome). Leffell/Zachary (1999) evaluate the updated 1995
UNOS schema by examining whether they promote racial equality and related criteria.
De Meester et al. (1999) explicitly evaluate the Eurotransplant rule on the basis of
weighing the societal aims of medical efficiency and equity. The considerations of the
preceding sections show that AWT agrees with those implicit interpersonal comparisons
that derive from the more fundamental motivation to protect rare or otherwise disad-
vantaged patient types. After only few organ allocations, the probability becomes small
that an organ is misallocated to a patient of an advantaged type to the detriment of a
disadvantaged patient. Even if unintended, more widespread interpersonal comparisons
are implicit in the Eurotransplant and UNOS allocation rules and directly affect the
patients eligibility and opportunity.
There is no moral basis for making these comparisons. It is both practically impossible
and morally inappropriate to make intra- and inter-personal comparisons of well–being on
behalf of the patients. Firstly, these comparisons would require a quantitative evaluation
of the effect of additional waiting time. A particular quantification often turns out to be
the artifact of a particular elicitation method (cf. the difference between the studies in
4Rules maximizing the sum of some point schema are known as utilitarian rules.
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this volume). Secondly, only patients have access to highly relevant information about
their own situation, such as the physical, psychological and emotional suffering that
additional waiting time inflicts on themselves and their families at a given point in time.
Thirdly, even medial experts disagree on how HLA matches and waiting time should be
weighted. No satisfactory method has ever been proposed for settling such disagreements
about the relative weight of medical and non–medical criteria. For the purpose of policy
recommendations, all three of these problems severely limit the usefulness of studies that
elicit medical expert’s subjective trade–offs. Apart from doubts about the feasibility
of making interpersonal comparisons systematically and coherently, it is also morally
inappropriate for society to make such decisions on behalf of a patient. This is especially
true if non–medical considerations about the patient’s particular psychological, social or
emotional situation are permitted. Compromising expected graft survival time in favour
of a shorter waiting period or other non–medical aspects is a deeply personal choice that
should not be taken away from the patient. As so many personal choices, it is also an
extremely complex and difficult choice for which the patient must be offered any possible
support.
This realization is the first step of a positive and constructive argument. Luce/Raiffa
(1957) point out that an inability to make inter-personal comparisons commits us to a
particular class of allocation rules. AWT falls within this distinguished class of allocation
rules. In other words, there are strong additional reasons in favour of AWT over and
above the optimality properties that we have established above.
Theorem. If we cannot make any interpersonal comparisons and if we want Pareto
optimality, then we must define some priority ranking among individuals and then proceed
in the way of our proposal. Namely, we must then choose an allocation that maximizes
the welfare of the individual with the highest priority, then that of the individual with the
second highest priority etc.
For a detailed proof, cf. Gevers (1979). Although this theorem does not tell us how
to prioritize patients, it tells us that AWT is of the correct type. We will now discuss
what factors other than waiting time should determine priority.
2.4 Special considerations
Children deserve special consideration in the allocation process because their physical
development during adolescence is severely impaired without a transplant. Similarly,
patients of high medical urgency simply to not have the time to wait for their entitlement
under AWT. Such patients must be moved forward on the waiting list. By assigning bonus
waiting times to such patients, we can determine whether they should be moved to the
very front of the waiting line or to some region close to the front.
By analogous means, we can adjust for regional and international import–export
imbalances. This is a problem of particular political importance for Eurotransplant where
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different nationalities contribute to and receive organs from a shared pool of donor organs,
thus increasing the probability of finding good HLA matches. AWT treats patients of
different origin equally and any imbalances of imports and export are the result of these
patients’ free choices. There may however exist some disadvantages for which certain
regions or nationalities deserve compensation. Since, for instance, cold ischemia time is
an important predictor of graft survival rates, patients from countries on the periphery
of the common allocation area are at a disadvantage. Caused by morally irrelevant
topographical facts, they have to accept on average somewhat longer transport times
and longer cold ischemia times. In order to offset such effects, we can again award a
bonus waiting time to patients from the periphery and thus move them ahead on the
waiting list.
More generally, there is a very simple algorithm for equalizing imbalances in attributes
that for moral reasons should be irrelevant. Think of attribute A as a central and of
attribute B as a peripheral geographical region in the allocation area.5 A general method
of compensating for irrelevant attributes calculates on a regular basis the average waiting
times W¯A and W¯B of patients of type A and type B. If W¯B exceeds W¯A, we award patients
of type B the difference W¯B − W¯A as their bonus waiting time. This method assumes
that the distribution of time preferences is identical among patients from area A and area
B. If patients from area B were on average less concerned about long waiting times and
more about good HLA matches, then this imbalance would be the result of a free choice
of the B patients. The question of which attributes deserve compensation needs to be
studied in more detail.
In the past, there has been a persistent shortage of donor organs and an excess
of patients in need of a graft. The European data for 1999 show that the net inflow
into the waiting list exceeded the net outflow by 198 patients even if we hypothetically
exclude additional demand through retransplantations.6 If this trend continues, average
waiting time will increase by 0.78 months per year, or about 4 months in 5 years. Under
these conditions, future patients are disadvantaged relative to current patients (leaving
aside potential but yet unforeseen advances in medical technology). We might consider
awarding patients who join the waiting list at a later time a bonus waiting time of 0.78
months per year to offset the birth–time disadvantage of future patients.
The same reasoning could be applied to the distribution of kidneys among small and
large transplantation centres. We could by the same method award a bonus to patients
from small transplantation centres if the strengthening of small transplantation centres
is politically desired. The moral relevance of some other attributes is much harder to
evaluate. Should the patient, e.g. a diabetic smoker, be held responsible for his past
5The attributes A and B must be such that the patients’ choices do not depend directly on A and B.
If, for example, all Austrian patients (attribute A) had a preference for Belgian kidneys, then Austrian
patients would clearly have to wait much longer than any other patient group (attribute B). This
increased waiting time is, however, is the result of a free choice of the Austrian patients.
6If we allow patients to rejoin the waiting list after they have lost their first transplant, the inflow
rate into the waiting list increases even more and further disadvantages future patients. This poses
additional questions about how re-transplant patients should be treated in the allocation process.
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behaviour leading to kidney failure? Such attributes play currently no role.
2.5 Practicability
The decision to accept or to reject a donor organ for transplantation poses a complex
and hard decision problem for the patient. Tragically, most important decisions in life
are of this nature. The patients in medical care will benefit from the counsel of their
medical advisers and the decision–making process must be structured so as to minimize
the psychological discomfort or anxiety experienced by the patient. To relieve the stress
of a instantaneous decision and to expedite the allocation process, the patients draft
together with their medical advisers a plan for when to accept an organ of what type.
The patient has the option to delegate the decision to the transplant surgeon or to
rely on the recommendations of a panel of medical experts such as the commission that
produce the European Best Practice Guide on Renal Transplantation. Patients with
impaired mental abilities or with mental disorders are represented by their guardians or
are treated under a default plan devise by an expert panel. The patients’ choices can
evolve and consolidate over time since they have the opportunity to revise their stated
preferences on a regular basis. A project is currently under way to develop a cognitively
and emotionally tractable format in which patients can absorb medical information about
their situation.
3 Conclusion
We summarize the properties of our proposal. Our proposal resolves concerns about
distributive justice:
• Disadvantaged patient types are automatically protected.
• Morally sensitive attributes such as sex, age and race can be used as selection
criteria without creating injustices.
• Age–specific programmes, such as Europe’s old–for–old programme, become super-
fluous. Waiting time creates an incentive for older people to consider accepting an
organ from an older patient without a great loss in their graft survival rate.
Patients and their medical advisers locally determine trade–offs between immunolog-
ical and non–immunological criteria and between medical and non–medical criteria:
• The patients’ informed consent allows an increased use of marginal donor organs
and protects transplant centres from liability claims.
• Involving patients in decision making has positive psychological effects and may be
conjectured to increase post–operative compliance with the medication regime.
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• Prioritization by waiting time is an extremely transparent and easy to understand
criterion. Point schemas, on the other hand, imposes a regime of abstract calcula-
tions that patients, physicians and politicians might find more difficult to accept.
Our allocation method adapts flexibly to new medical developments:
• The allocation mechanism remains impartial in the controversy about the relative
importance of HLA mismatching and cold ischemia times.
• No revisions of the mechanism are needed when new medical factors emerge or
when of new medical technology is created.
A crucial prerequisite of AWT is the development of a support system for patients and
their surgeons. Central authorities such as UNOS or Eurotransplant will continue to play
a crucial role by formulating best practice guidelines, by monitoring the information and
the support that is provided to the patients and by maintaining the allocation process.
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Appendix A Optimality
Any allocation algorithm has to operate in a stochastic environment in which organs and patients of
different types become available in a random order and at random times. We wish to find the probability
that a patient of a ‘disadvantaged’ type is passed over in favour of a patient of an ‘advantaged’ type.
We derive this probability under the worst–case assumptions that advantaged patients can accept any
organ and disadvantaged patients can only accept organs of their own type. We are at this point not
interested how patients discriminate between subtypes of organs. It is then enough that we distinguish
two medical types (1, 2) of patients and organs. For patients of type 2, we also distinguish between two
sub-types 2a, 2b. We adopt the following worst–case rules that will govern the dynamics of the waiting
list:
1. Patients of type 1 and type 2b accept organs of type 1 and type 2.
2. Patients of type 2a accept only organs of type 2.
The probability that an organ of type 1 becomes available is 1− q and the probability that an organ
of type 2 becomes available is q. The probability that a patient of type 1 is added to the waiting list
is 1− p, the probability that a patient of type 2a is added to the waiting list is αp and the probability
that a patient of type 2b is added to the waiting list is (1 − α)p. We assume that drop–out rates from
the waiting list have already been subtracted from the rates with which patients join the waiting list.
We assume that these probabilities are independent of each other. In other words, the event of an organ
becoming available does not affect the probability of a patient with a certain type joining the waiting
list. We also assume that these probabilities remain constant over time and that patient do not rejoin
the waiting list for a second transplant. We assume that the waiting list is long enough so that there
is always demand for an organ. In the future this situation may perhaps change, but it is the reality of
today. Thanks to this simplifying assumption, we are able to treat the problem with analytical means.
We model the waiting list by a sequence x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . . where xn = 1, 2a, 2b and where x1 is the type
of the patient who has been waiting the longest. Before any organs have been allocated, the probability
that xn = 1, 2a, 2b is 1− p, αp and (1− α)p, respectively. The composition of waiting list changes with
time depending on the allocation rule and depending on the organs that become available.
In an optimal allocation for the selective type 2a, any patient of this type receives an organ of type
2 so that a proportion of q − αp type 2 organs that is left for the remaining patients. If this remaining
portion of type 2 organs is allocated randomly among the patients of type 1 and type 2b, then the
smallest possible probability of allocating a type 2 organ to a patient of type 1 is
pmin = (q − αp) · 1− p1− αp, when αp 6= 1. (1)
pmin = 0, else.
We derive the probability pn that an organ of type 2 is allocated to a patient of type 1. Such an
allocation occurs when an organ of type 2 arrives while a patient of type 1 is at the first position of the
waiting list after the n− 1st arrival of an organ. Recall that patients of type 1 and type 2b accept any
organ. Hence, if we consider a patient of one of these types at position k, we know that no patient with
a rank l ≥ k has so far received an organ. A patient at rank l after n organ arrivals must therefore have
held rank l+n before any organs arrived. Hence, the probability of the patient at rank l being of type i
after n organ arrivals is identical to the probability that, before any organs have arrived, the patient at
rank l+n is of type i. If we know that the initial part of the sequence of patients after n organ arrivals is
〈~x, 1〉 or 〈~x, 2b〉, then the probability of the sequence continuing as ~y is only determined by the number
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m1 of patients of type 1 in ~y, the number m2 of patients of type 2a in ~y and the number m3 of patients
of type 2b in ~y. For i = 1, 2b,
Pn(〈~x, i, ~y〉|〈~x, i〉) = (1− p)m1(αp)m2(p− αp)m3 (2)
When αp 6= 1, we also have
Pn(〈~x, 1〉|〈~x, 1〉 or 〈~x, 2b〉) = 1− p1− αp (3)
For any n ∈ N and k ∈ N+, we write Qn(k) for the probability that the first patient of type 1 or
type 2b occurs at position k after the nth arrival of an organ. For any k ∈ N+, we have
Q0(k) = (αp)k−1(1− αp) (4)
Suppose we already know Qn(k) (for any k ∈ N). We now derive Qn+1(k) (for any k ∈ N). In a
(n + 1)–sequence of organs, the last organ is of type 1 (Case 1) with probability 1 − q and of type 2
(Case 2) with probability q. We consider all l ∈ N+ sub-cases in which the first patient of type 1 or type
2b occurs at position l. The probability Qn(l) of each such sub-case is independent of the type of the
n+1st organ and thus independent of Case 1 and Case 2. Case 1: The n+1st organ is of type 1. Such
an organ is rejected by patients of type 2a and accepted by patients of type 1 and type 2b. Conditional
on l ≤ k, the probability that, after n+ 1 organ arrivals, the first patient of type 1 or type 2b occurs at
rank k is (by (2)) the probability of l being followed by k − l patients of type 2a and 1 patient of type
1 or type 2b, i.e., (αp)k−l(1 − αp). Conditional on l > k, this probability is zero. Case 2: The n + 1st
organ is of type 2. Such an organ is accepted by any patient. Conditional on l = 1, the probability
that, after n + 1 organ arrivals, the first patient of type 1 or type 2b occurs at rank k is (by (2)) the
probability of the first patient being followed by k−1 patients of type 2a and 1 patient of type 1 or type
2b, i.e., (αp)k−1(1− αp). Conditional on l = k + 1, the probability that, after n+ 1 organ arrivals, the
first patient of type 1 or type 2b occurs at rank k is trivially one. Conditional on 2 ≤ l ≤ k or k+2 ≤ l,
this probability is zero. We thus obtain
Qn+1(k) = (1− q)
 ∑
1≤l≤k
Qn(l) · (αp)k−l(1− αp)
 (5)
+ q
(
Qn(1) · (αp)k−1(1− αp) +Qn(k + 1)
)
Moreover, we can now derive the probability that a patient of type 1 is at the front of the waiting
list after n ∈ N organ arrivals. When αp = 1, this probability is zero and Qn(1) · 1−p1−αp otherwise (by
(3)). We finally arrive at the probability pn that the nth organ (n ∈ N+) is misallocated.
pn = Qn−1(1) · q 1− p1− αp, when αp 6= 1. (6)
pn = 0, else.
Next, we obtain the expected proportion of losses of organs of type 2 after n ∈ N+ organ arrivals:
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en =
En
q · n, when q 6= 0. (7)
en = 0, else.
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